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Corporate Environmental Proactivity: Evidence from the 











In the presence of environmental policy, how do regulated firms respond? The answer is crucial 
for the design and effectiveness of policy regimes intended to mitigate environmental damage. 
We investigate whether particular types of firms are more likely to be proactive; in other words, 
which firms tend to behave in a manner most consistent with the desired policy outcomes. 
Using data on per-firm ‘verified’ and ‘allocated’ emissions from the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) from 2005 till 2016, and given some firms exceed or 
undershoot the allocated allowances by a large margin, we posit that this and related measures 
are useful proxies for a firm’s proactiveness in responding to environmental policy. We find 
that public firms are less likely than private firms to be proactive, whilst the same is found for 
firms in common rather than civil law countries and for state-owned firms. Strikingly, 
proactiveness is associated both with greater reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and 
poorer firm performance suggesting there is an economic cost to good environmental 
behaviour. Whilst the EU ETS is reducing emissions, it is not yet adequately compensating 
proactive firms or penalising those who pollute - better system design could aid this further.  
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performance.  
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A major question for firms is how to respond when government or other non-market actors 
seek to alter industry behaviour (see Backman et al., 2017; Verbeke et al., 2017). Whether 
firms change their behaviour, and the degree of this change, is likely related to a number of 
both internal (e.g., the effect on firm performance and relevant technical knowledge) and 
external factors (e.g., the regulatory costs of non-compliance). Likewise, a vital question for 
non-market actors is how to ensure the desired firm-level response from the design and 
implementation of policy. In particular, this may consist of a compliance threshold for firms 
plus an encouragement to behave below the regulatory enforced level.  
Perhaps the most important contemporary policy space ─ where answers to these two 
above questions are required ─ is that of the environment, related concerns about climate 
change and the desire of many to move the global economy from reliance on hydrocarbons to 
renewable sources of energy. For example, consider the Kyoto Protocol, which agreed to 
reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to ‘a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (see UNFCCC, Art. 2). Since the Protocol 
was agreed in December 1997 and came into force in February 2005, countries and regions 
have sought to limit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions (GGE) using a variety 
of approaches. In particular, the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
employs a cap and trade principle where, given a maximum EU wide cap on emissions, 
participating organisations must purchase additional allowances if they exceed their individual 
target and conversely, can sell allowances if they undershoot.  
Our study uses annual data from 2005 to 2016 on the EU per-firm ‘allocated 
allowances’ and crucially, the ‘verified emissions.’ Interestingly, some firms exceed or 
undershoot the allocated allowanced by a (large) margin and we posit that this and related 
measures are useful proxies for a firm’s proactiveness in responding to environmental policy. 
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Our first research question is therefore to ask which factors explain movements in these 
proxies, including measures of firm type, legal environment and state ownership. To derive 
appropriate hypotheses, we draw together several strands of relevant literature including work 
on comparative capitalisms that specifies how different types of firm governance imply 
whether managers can make investment choices, including those related to the environment, 
over shorter or longer-term horizons (see, inter alia, Whitley, 2008 and Hall and Soskice, 
2001).  
Subsequently, our second research question examines how corporate environmental 
proactivity in the EU ETS affects both the environment, in terms of reducing GGE, and firm 
performance, after allowing for several control variables. These are two key areas of 
investigation to assess the effectiveness of the emissions trading system and inform any policy 
debate around the design of the mechanism itself. Of course, one might assume a priori that 
emissions reduction and firm performance are also linked: for example, if reducing GGE 
inhibits firm performance, the average firm is likely to be less environmentally proactive and 
this will reduce the overall effectiveness of the policy.    
The remaining parts of the paper are divided into six sections: Section 2 considers the 
extant literature and theoretical underpinnings of our work; describing in detail the EU ETS 
mechanism and developing a definition of corporate environmental proactivity and related 
hypotheses. Section 3 provides an overview of the data and methodology whilst section 4 
presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 provides the related discussion and conclusion.  
 
Literature and theoretical underpinnings  
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
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The EU has targeted a reduction in GGE1, relative to 1990 levels, of 20 percent by 2020 and 
‘by at least’ 40 percent by 2030 (see European Commission report, 2017).2 The main vehicle 
for achieving these objectives is the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
established by directive 2003/87/CE of 13 October 2003 and officially started on 1 January 
2005, aiming to limit emissions for about 12,000 heavy energy-using installations. Since then, 
GGE in Europe are capped, traded and priced. This cap-and-trade scheme is the world’s first 
and largest multinational program for emissions reduction and covers around 45 percent of the 
EU's GGE. In a nutshell, the EU ETS works as follows: Firms receive (at the installation level) 
emission allowances, which in total do not exceed a predetermined annual cap set by the 
scheme. A cap is also set on the total amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted 
by all installations covered by the system. Within their individual cap, if firms chose to pollute 
more than the allowances they received, then they must purchase extra allowances in the open 
market from firms who used less from the allocated quantities, and vice versa. This system, 
combined with the fact that the total cap is reduced over time so that total emissions fall, creates 
incentives to polluters to reduce emissions (e.g., switching to less carbon-intensive production 
technologies) so they can sell the surplus for profit.   
The EU ETS is presently in its third phase of operation; accordingly, in Phase I (2005-
2007) and II (2008-2012) allowances were given free of charge, whereby in Phase III (2013-
2020) some allowances are purchased through auctions. Given the importance of the EU ETS 
mechanism, work such as Laing et al. (2013) have surveyed the extant literature evaluating its 
efficacy. They suggest that some abatement in GGE has occurred and that the phased design 
has led to improvements (e.g., dealing with the initial over-allocation of allowances) in the 
mechanism. Certainly, the system, based on the latest data3, has coincided with reduced 
                                                 
1 GGE includes carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, perfluorocarbons (PFC) emissions from aluminium production 
and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from all nitric, adipic, glyoxylic acid and glyoxal production. 
2 The same report noted that by 2015, GGE were already reduced by 22 percent of 1990 levels.  
3 See https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/dashboards/emissions-trading-viewer-1 
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emissions overall within participating installations as shown in Figure 1. Between 2005 and 
2017, GGE have fallen by approximately 26 percent.4 Interestingly, the price of the allowances 
has fluctuated considerably across the three phases, as shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here] 
Considering the EU ETS objectives, framework and operation to date, several 
interesting research questions present themselves. Given the mechanism appears broadly 
successful in reducing emissions, how have different types of firms responded to the policy? 
Specifically, which firms might be classified as most or least responsive? Moreover, how has 
this ‘responsiveness’ affected the performance of firms?5 To answer these questions we first 
need to explore how the extant literature has categorized firm behaviour in the context of 
environmental strategy more generally and specifically, the degree of compliance with related 
legislation. 
 
Corporate environmental proactiveness 
When discussing the behaviour of firms in relation to strategy often the extant literature refers 
to whether firms are proactive or not, but the characterizations of ‘proactiveness’ vary. For 
example, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) suggest that proactiveness is one of the five components 
of a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation, arguing in later work that “Proactiveness is an 
opportunity-seeking, forward-looking perspective involving introducing new products or 
services ahead of the competition and acting in anticipation of future demand to create change 
and shape the environment” (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001: p.431).  
                                                 
4 Phase IV (2021-2030) aims to reduce the emissions of participating installations by 43 percent of 2005 values.   
5 Although there is some analysis on the carbon market operation from a finance perspective (e.g., Oestreich and 
Tsiakas, 2015), we are not aware of any work that links policy responsiveness to firm performance. They show, 
using a sample of German firms, that those allocated free allowances significantly outperformed those that did 
not (in terms of stock returns) over approximately the period 2004 to early 2009. 
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Of course, in the specific context of a firm’s environmental impact, a forward-looking 
perspective will also involve consideration of mitigating harmful processes as well as products 
and future demand.6 There have been several attempts in the literature to present a more holistic 
view. Employing a resource-based theoretical approach, Hart (1995) differentiates between 
four types of environmental perspectives at the firm level, including pollution prevention.7 
Developing this idea, Buysse and Verbeke (2003) propose five resource domains representing 
environmental competencies in employee skills, strategic planning, management systems, 
functional area (e.g., research and design, finance, production et cetera) involvement in 
greening the firm and green technology investment; with a firm’s activity in these domains 
determining its environmental proactiveness (see Backman et al., 2017).   
The literature has suggested that a firm’s action in the green technology resource 
domain can be the clearest indication of its degree of environmental proactivity (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 1998). Such investments can often be in response to regulatory requirements (see 
Verbeke et al., 2017) and in this sense, proactive environmental strategies have been commonly 
defined as practices that go further than legal compliance with environmental legislation (see 
inter alia, Buysse and Verbeke, 2003). Developing this framing, proactiveness can be assessed 
on a continuum (Aragón-Correa and Rubio-López, 2007; Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003), 
whereby the level of environmental proactiveness equates to the degree of compliance with 
regulation, and three discrete regions of the continuum can be identified signifying firm 
behaviour from most advanced (i.e., proactive behaviour beyond compliance), reactive (i.e., 
behaviour equivalent to legal compliance only) and active resistance (i.e., lobbying authorities 
to reduce environmental requirements or delay introduction – see Verbeke et al., 2017).    
                                                 
6 Note however, there is some evidence of a positive correlation between a firm’s general strategic position and 
its environmental proactivity (Aragón-Correa, 1998).  
7 The others are an end-of-pipe approach, product stewardship and sustainable development.  
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For cap-and-trade schemes, such as the EU ETS, we posit that an analogous typology 
can be developed. In particular, the allowances provided to each firm provide an anchor around 
which to assess environmental credentials and again provide three distinct regions of 
environmental behaviour: firms in the scheme that pollute less than their allowances can be 
denoted environmentally proactive, those that pollute an equivalent amount to their allowance 
can be considered reactive or environmentally neutral and finally, firms that produce more 
GGE than allowances can be regarded environmentally resistant.8 Given unused allowances 
can be sold on a carbon exchange, the ETS mechanism is designed to encourage firms to be 
environmentally proactive in the manner defined.  
 
Measuring environmental proactiveness 
To judge a company’s environmental practice, the extant literature has typically employed 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria such as the popular Kinder Lydenberg 
Domini (KLD) ratings (see Kim, 2018). However, Mattingly and Berman (2006) advise caution 
when using these ratings as a proxy for firm practice. Whether or not KLD/ESG measures are 
reasonable proxies for firm practices, one might argue that environmental performance (which 
can be measured by emissions release data – see Färe et al., 2010) is a more appropriate 
measure about whether firms are environmentally proactive.9 Moreover, from our discussion 
in the previous section, it could be argued for the EU ETS that the distance quantity: 
   
 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖𝑡)/?̃?𝑖𝑡, (1) 
 
                                                 
8 Our definition of ‘environmentally resistant’ within the EU ETS is necessarily different from the ‘active 
resistance’ of Verbeke et al., 2017. Whilst active resistance may involve lobbying to reduce or delay standards 
(information which can perhaps only be gleaned by survey) our environmental resistance involves producing more 
GGE than allowances. 
9 For example, Aragón-Correa and Rubio-López (2007) noted that surveys on firms’ attitudes to environmental 
issues may reflect social bias.  
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where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the verified emissions of firm i in year t, ?̃?𝑖𝑡 are the allocated allowances and 
therefore 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡, represents the proportionate excess emissions, captures the continuum of 
environmental responses and therefore nests the discrete regions of environmental proaction, 
reaction and resistance. Specifically, if 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≈ 0, then firm i is merely complying with 
regulation and could therefore be considered reactive. If 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≫ 0, then firm i has overshot 
its target allowances, is not responding to policy and is environmentally resistant. Finally, if 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≪ 0, then firm i has undershot target, and is thus can be regarded as environmentally 
proactive. In our later empirical work, we classify firms as included in this latter category (i.e., 
environmentally proactive) if their 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡  is less than or equal to –20 percent. This seemed an 
appropriate threshold, given approximately a third of our firm-year observations fall into this 
category (see our later Data section) and ensuring the grouping has enough degrees of freedom 
whilst still capturing good environmental behaviour.10  
 Of course, in the case of the EU ETS and as noted above, if a company produces more 
GGE than allowed, then they must provide ‘compensation’ by purchasing extra allowances. 
Likewise, a company that pollutes below allocation, can sell its unused allowances in the open 
market. Hence, an economic version of (1) would be:  
 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 = (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖𝑡)𝑓𝑡, (2) 
 
where 𝑓𝑡 is the appropriate futures price for GGE allowances. In the later analysis, we employ 
a standardized version of (2), namely 𝑧𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡. Below we expand on these ideas to develop 
hypotheses related to the characteristics of firms that are more likely to be environmentally 
proactive. 
                                                 
10 We also check later whether our empirical findings remain robust for different thresholds of proactiveness  (i.e., 




Ownership and environmental proactiveness 
Environmental proactiveness, where firms behave beyond compliance, has been viewed in the 
literature as an attempt to satisfy the values of various (market and non-market) stakeholders 
aside from regulators (Hart, 1995; Garrod, 1997). These other interested stakeholders could 
include shareholders, customers, environmentally-orientated NGOs and local community-
focused groups. Notably, there is empirical evidence of a positive association between 
proactiveness and stakeholder interest. For example, using survey data from 197 Belgian firms, 
Buysee and Verbeke (2003) show that firms classified as practicing environmental leadership 
are more likely than reactive firms to consider stakeholders in decision making.   
 Of course, not all stakeholders will be perceived as equally important by managers 
when formulating environmental strategy. Henriques and Sadorsky (1999), examining 
Canadian firms, suggested shareholders and customers amongst others as key influences on 
firm practice. Somewhat contrastingly, Buysee and Verbeke (2003) showed that while 
proactive firms considered internal primary stakeholders (i.e., shareholders, employees and 
financial institutions), there was little evidence to support consideration of external primary 
stakeholders (i.e., customer and suppliers) or secondary stakeholders (i.e., media, competitors, 
NGOs and international agreements). From an EU ETS perspective, given regulated firms will 
typically be power or industrial/manufacturing firms involved in intermediate goods 
production11, this a priori suggests that internal primary stakeholders are likely significant 
determinants of a firm’s degree of environmental proactiveness.   
 Of the internal primary stakeholders of EU ETS firms, we focus on the owners. These 
can be considered the most important and therefore influential of such stakeholders (see Buysee 
                                                 
11 Buysee and Verbeke (2003) note that firms that produce intermediate goods are less likely to engage with 
external primary stakeholders due to the lack of direct contact with the final consumer.  
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and Verbeke, 2003). Taking a high-level approach, Whitley (2008) notes that given that 
governance differs across firms, consequently so does their dominant logics of action. In 
particular, to explore these linkages he suggests that the influence of ownership on managers’ 
strategic choice, can divided into four main ‘situations’. The first situation is the archetypal 
owner-controlled firm, whereby majority owners oversee daily operations and therefore 
managers have little autonomy. The second situation corresponds to where ownership is more 
dispersed but concentrated enough (i.e., control over large blocks of shareholders’ votes) to 
affect the overall strategic direction of the firm. The third situation encompasses some market-
based forms of owner control, where ownership is highly dispersed amongst many investors, 
each more interested in the performance of their own portfolio; consequently, managers’ should 
have a large degree of autonomy over firm-specific strategic choice. Finally, the fourth 
situation recognises that within a market-based form, share ownership can become dominated 
by short-term performance orientated fund managers. In this latter context, managers can once 
again become highly constrained.  
Broadly speaking the four ownership types represent private (i.e., situation 1 and 2) and 
public firms (i.e., situation 3 and 4). Using the classifications above, private ownership at the 
very least, has a significance influence on strategic direction. As a corollary, if owners are 
committed to long-term development plans, including in the environmental sphere, such plans 
are likely to be implemented with relatively little interference from outside control given 
private firms typically have less obligation to release their firms’ details, report finances or 
answer to the public or media. By contrast, the managers of public firms are likely to be under 
pressure to generate short-term financial returns for shareholders; pressures which Whitley 
(2008) stresses have grown over the latter years of the 20th century and restricted long-term 
planning.     
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Whether firms have long or short time horizon for strategy and investment has been 
shown as integral to their degree of environmental proactivity. Particularly, Verbeke et al. 
(2017) in a study of imposed carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, found that firms 
facing short-term performance requirements often adopted a reactive compliance strategy. On 
the other hand, firms with a longer horizon could be more proactive, “The longer-term view 
they embraced allowed management to conceive early adoption of the imposed innovation in 
project terms and drove the establishment of unique capabilities that might well support future 
competitive advantage” (p.692).  
Conflating the notions that firms with short-term strategy horizons are likely to be 
relatively less environmentally proactive, and that public firms are more likely to present a 
short-term strategy horizon, leads to our initial hypothesis: 
  
H1: Publicly listed companies are less environmentally proactive on average than their 
private analogues. 
 
Of course, shareholders are not limited to private citizens, other companies or 
investment funds. The state can take full or partial ownership of a firm. Indeed, a recent EU 
Commission (2016) institutional paper noted that, “State-owned enterprises (SOEs) account 
for a large share of output and employment in many EU member states” (p.6) and that, for 
example, SOEs share of total energy sector turnover was 40 percent.12 A typical view in the 
literature is that SOEs are economically inefficient (see Boycko et al., 1996). Adopting an 
agency cost perspective, managers are often politically appointed and have little incentive to 
improve performance by allocating resources or investing optimally (Krueger, 1990).  
                                                 
12 The sample period was 2008-2012 and SOEs were defined as firms where the state holds at least 20 percent of 
the equity.   
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Moreover, board level appointments provide lax monitoring and may attempt to extract rents 
(Hsu et al., 2018), with an overall picture of weak financial performance and corporate 
governance (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). 
 An alternative view also exists which suggests that state ownership may confer 
functionality to usefully mitigate externalities such as pollution, particularly given a 
government’s greater ability (compared to the private sector) to fund long-term investment in 
technologies such as carbon capture. Recently Hsu et al. (2018), using a sample of publicly 
listed firms across 45 countries from 2004 to 2014, showed that SOEs in emerging countries 
have greater involvement in environmental issues than other firms. Interestingly this difference 
was not maintained for SOEs in developed countries which may have a greater availability of 
capital financing outside government sources.  
Given these competing perspectives, the role of state ownership in EU ETS firm 
proactivity is clearly an empirical question. However, a priori, we note that since 2004 a 
number of new member states have joined the EU with a relatively high proportion of SOEs 
(e.g., Poland, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia). As a whole, these new member state firms have 
lagged substantially behind other firms in terms of performance measures such as return on 
equity (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, given the transitional nature of their 
economies, many SOEs may not give sufficient priority to longer-term objectives such as 
environmental reform. At an EU wide level therefore, we might expect the following:      
 
H2: State owned firms are less environmentally proactive on average than other 
companies.  
 
Of course, states can have indirect, non-ownership effects, on firms within their jurisdiction 
and Amable (2016) suggests that state intervention can differ conditional on the political hue 
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of the government. Amongst other things, Allen et al. (2018) stress the role states have in 
producing sources of advanced knowledge generation and as Laffont and Tirole (1993) discuss, 
states can legislate to mandate particular types of firm behaviour or provide incentives via 
subsidies. Indeed, it is important to recognise that different legal settings may well affect the 
environmental proactivity of firms. Work by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) stress that differences 
in states legal origin partially determine contemporary differences in corporate governance. In 
other words, common law countries (e.g., U.S, most of the U.K, Ireland) present a liberal 
market shareholder-orientated approach, whilst civil law countries (e.g., Scandinavia, France, 
Germany) provide a coordinated market system with multi-stakeholder types of governance 
(Ahlering and Deakin, 2006). This distinction between liberal and coordinated markets in the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ literature (see Hall and Soskice, 2001) is often seen to correspond to 
governance systems based on either arms-length/outsider control or direct/insider control 
(Berglöf, 1997). Common law countries are associated with governance mechanisms in which 
outsiders require relatively high rates of return over short-time horizons, whilst in civil law 
countries, insider control governance allows for longer time frames for decision-making and 
investment. Assuming as before that firms with short term strategy horizons are likely to be 
relatively less environmentally proactive, leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3:  Firms within civil law countries are more likely to be environmentally proactive as 
compared to firms embedded in common law frameworks. 
 
Such an approach is quite broad and whilst useful, it is important to bear in mind that a more 
nuanced picture can exist at national level. For example, whilst most of the U.K predominantly 
follows a common law approach, Scotland largely has a civil law framework. Moreover, firms 
in the same country will not all be affected uniformly by the typical governance frame. Clearly, 
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although this might not be the case for the average firm, some firms in civil law countries will 
be under short-term pressure for high returns; likewise, there will be those in common law 
countries who can adopt a longer-term perspective (Ahlering and Deakin, 2006). 
 
Environmental proactiveness, volume of emissions and firm performance 
What is the effect of corporate environmental proactivity in the EU ETS on both the 
environment and firm performance? These are the two key questions to inform any policy 
debate around the design of the mechanism itself. To begin, it seems straightforward to 
hypothesise: 
 
H4:  GGE will be reduced further by firms that are environmentally proactive.  
 
Of course, the amount of GGE reduction associated with a particular degree of proactiveness 
will be important and is an empirical question. A more involved discussion is required for the 
relation between environmental proactiveness and firm performance. From the Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) literature, it appears there may be a negative association between 
high CSR expenditure and firm value/performance at least over the short-term (see, inter alia, 
Gregory et al., 2014). In particular, companies that invest heavily in pollution reducing 
technology may suffer a diminution in short-term cash flows. Within the EU ETS itself, a firm’s 
performance will be affected, ceteris paribus, by whether (i) they have to buy extra allowances 
or can sell excess allowances, and the prevailing futures price (ii) the amount of investment in 
pollution-reducing processes and (iii) the ability to pass-through any additional input cost to 
the consumer. Given the GGE futures price was considered low for much of our sample 
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period13, that investment in technology typically takes several years to realize and pass-through 
can often be limited by regulatory authorities, our final hypothesis is:  
 
H5: Environmental proactiveness has a negative effect on firm performance in the short-
term. 
 
Data and methodology 
Data 
Our study exploits the EU ETS Company Database that consolidates information as reported 
by the European Union Transaction Log, which is a source of verified GGE information, set 
up by the European Commission. The raw dataset includes 1,018 publicly listed and private 
companies from 31 European countries (i.e., the EU-28 zone, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein), accounting for more than 90% of GGE from EU ETS companies and featuring 
12,210 firm-year observations.  
The sample spans the period 2005-2016 and covers all three different EU ETS phases; 
accordingly, in Phase I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012) allowances were given free of charge, 
whereby in Phase III (2013-2020) some allowances are purchased through auctions. The 
database includes information about the per firm number of facilities/installations, as well as 
the per firm allocated and verified emissions, covering different industries such as Oil and Gas, 
Power and Heat, Motor, Chemicals, Metals, et cetera. After eliminating observations with 
missing information about the sector that firms operate in, firms’ headquarters location or 
allocated/verified emissions, the sample includes 887 firms featuring 9,645 firm-year 
observations. 
                                                 
13 For example, in phase III, the futures price was typically below €10 and sometimes even below €5 per tonne. 
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About 89% of the observations relate to firms headquartered in EU-28 countries, 2.5% 
relate to firms headquartered in other European countries (i.e., Norway, Switzerland and 
Ukraine) and rest relate to firms headquartered in non-European countries. Further, there are 
16 distinct industries in this sample, with some industries representing a sizeable proportion of 
the firm-year observations (e.g., Power and Heat is approximately 29 percent) while some 
others cover a negligible proportion (e.g., Coke, Education, Mining, Pharmaceutical, Water 
Utilities are less than 1 percent per case). For conducting the analysis, two more filtering 
criteria have been applied: 
i. industries with less than 1 percent representation in the sample are eliminated; we 
imposed this filter to minimize the impact of sectors that are underrepresented in the 
sample (however, this exclusion is based on the number of observations not the volume 
of emissions relating to these observations); 
ii. observations with 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 as per Eq. (1) greater than 300% are also eliminated; we have 
imposed this filter to minimize the impact of outliers evidenced by the large difference 
between the “mean” and “median” values of this variable before the imposition of 
filtering.  
The final sample therefore includes 856 firms featuring 8,942 firm-year observations 
originating from 11 industries. The summary statistics for firm-level emissions and related 
variables used to test H1 to H4, following the above filtering procedure, are provided in Table 
1, whilst detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.14  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In section 2, it was noted that an economic measure of excess emissions following Eq. 
(2) would require an appropriate futures price for GGE allowances and this price is plotted in 
                                                 
14 Data items like the country of origin for each firm, percentage of state ownership, and macro variables are hand 




Figure 2. The variable 𝑓𝑡 that we construct, is the monthly average value (within a calendar 
year) using the monthly settlement prices of EUA futures contracts obtained through Thomson 
Reuters DataStream. Such futures contracts are traded on the European Climate Exchange 
(ECX) which is owned by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). In line with Oestreich and 
Tsiakas (2015), we construct a continuous price series combining a series of futures contracts 
as follows: During Phase I (2005-2007) our series is equal to the price of the December 2008 
contract. During Phase II (2008-2012) the series is equal to the price of the December 2009 
contract until its last trading day, and then switches to December 2010 until its last trading day 
and so on until December 2012. During Phase III (2013-2016) we follow the same procedure 
and set the series equal to the futures contract with maturity in December of each year for all 
the trading days of the year.  
Based on mean values in Table 1 featuring 8,942 observations for all variables 
tabulated, firms appear to overshoot (EE) by 87,779 units their allocated allowances, in terms 
of percentage excess emissions (EEP) they undershoot by 2 percent, whilst in terms of euro 
excess emissions (EEE) they incur a cost equal to €994,319 for overshooting their allocated 
allowances. Further, 33.5 percent of the firms appear to undershoot by more than 20 percent 
their allocated allowances, hence these are the firms which we account as being 
environmentally proactive (PR020); a per year-industry adjusted version of this variable 
(PR20_IA) labels 20.9 percent of the sample firm-observations as being environmentally 
proactive. Other statistics indicate that: firms employ 9.707 facilities/installations 
(INSTALLATIONS) that produce CO2 equivalent emissions; 30.6 percent of the observations 
feature publicly-listed (PUBLIC) firms, 5.7 percent of the observations refer to state-owned 
(STATE) firms, 89.2 percent of the observations feature firms headquartered in the EU-28 zone 
(EU28) and 14.5 percent of the observation regard firms that operate within common law legal 
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systems (COMMON). Lastly, 26.1 percent of the observations originate from Phase I, 44.3 
percent from Phase II and 29.6 from Phase III. 
Finally, in Table 2 we report summary statistics for the firm-level performance 
variables and various controls used for testing H5 (detailed variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix). The financial data are primarily from Compustat Global but we also checked 
for all companies manually and hand collected further information to increase the sample size. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent from the top and bottom of their 
distribution. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Based on mean values in Table 2, firms in our sample show a return on equity (ROE) 
equal to 20.6 percent, annual cumulative market return performance (RET) equal to 3.4 percent, 
whilst their operating performance as captured by return on assets (ROA) is equal to 6.1 percent. 
Their operating profitability is 29.4 percent of the beginning of the fiscal period sales (EARN), 
operating cash flow is 53.3 percent of the beginning of the fiscal period stockholders’ equity 
(CASH FLOW), asset growth (ASSET GROWTH) stands at 50.5 percent15, capital expenditures 
are 9.4 percent of the beginning of the fiscal period assets (CAPEX), total debt is 96 percent of 
stockholders’ equity (LEV), and research and development expense is 0.9 percent of sales 
(R&D). Further, industry competition as measured by the Herfindahl index is 0.133 
(HERFINDAHL), the GDP growth in the sample countries is 1.2 percent, whilst the short-term 
interest rate stands at 2.1 percent.          
 
Methodology 
                                                 
15 This mean value seems rather high because it is affected by few extreme observations. Note that the median 
value of ASSET GROWTH is 2.8 percent which is a more reasonable rate of growth. 
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To begin, we note that hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 posit that publicly-listed, state-owned and 
firms headquartered in common law legal systems, respectively, are less environmentally 
proactive compared to their peers. Initially, we therefore estimate variants of the following 
panel regression:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 
+𝛾6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,  (3) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is either of our two measures of excess emissions in Eq. (1) and (2) for firm i in year 
t, namely EEP and EEE, PUBLIC is a dummy variable indicating publicly-listed firms (i.e., it 
takes the value 1 for a publicly-listed firm, and 0 otherwise), STATE is a dummy variable 
representing when the national government has a stake in the firm (i.e.,  it takes the value 1 
when the government has a stake of 5 percent or more, and 0 otherwise), COMMON is a 
dummy variable representing whether a firm’s headquarters are located in a common law legal 
system (i.e., it takes the value 1 for common law legal systems, and 0 otherwise), and  𝑖𝑡, is a 
stochastic error term. Further, the vector X contains additional control variables (i.e., EU28, 
INSTALLATIONS) and fixed effects (i.e., PHASE II & III dummies, industry dummies). For 
H1, H2 and H3 to hold, we primarily anticipate 𝛾1 > 0, 𝛾2 > 0  and 𝛾3 > 0, respectively. 
 Additionally, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡 in Eq. (3) characterizes one of two types of specific 
environmental proactivity:  𝑃𝑅𝑂20𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤
 −20 percent, and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑅20_𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy variable that is 1 when the per-
year and per-industry mean adjusted value of 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ −20 percent, and 0 otherwise. To 
investigate the behaviour of publicly-listed firms, state-owned firms and firms headquartered 
in common law legal systems within the proactive range, we interact the proactive variables 
with PUBLIC, STATE and COMMON, respectively. All regression models (as well as all 
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subsequent ones) are estimated using robust standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity and clustered across firms and years.  
 Hypotheses H4 and H5 examine the effect of the firms’ EU ETS proactive behaviour 
on two key areas – emissions reduction and firm performance. As discussed earlier, the fourth 
hypothesis (H4) examines the extent to which GGE will be reduced by firms that are 
environmentally proactive, where being environmentally proactive is proxied by either PRO20 
or PRO20_IA. As such, we estimate variants of the following regression: 
 
 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+𝑗 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑅𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+𝑗, (4) 
 
where 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+𝑗 is the future growth rate in a firm’s verified emissions between year t+1 
and t+j, the vector X includes all controls analogously to Eq. (3) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+𝑗 is a stochastic 
error term. For H4 to hold, we primarily expect  𝜃1 < 0.  
Our final hypothesis H5 suggests a negative relationship between a firm’s 
environmentally proactive behaviour and firm performance in the short-term, thus, we 
correspondingly estimate variants of the following regression specification:  
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡+1 (5) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 represents firm performance in year t+1 as captured by either a firm’s return on 
equity (ROE) or annual cumulative market return (RET) and 𝑣𝑖𝑡+1 is a stochastic error term. 
The vector F includes controls as featured in Table 2 and fixed effects (i.e., phase II and III 
dummies, industry dummies). Eq. (5) is estimated particularly on publicly listed companies 
where information regarding firm characteristics and performance are available. For H5 to 
hold, we primarily anticipate 𝛿1 < 0.  
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In regression equations (4) and (5) we are attempting to identify causal relationships 
between a firm’s proactive behaviour and future reductions in emissions or firm performance. 
In this context, endogeneity issues can occur via omitted variable bias or reverse causality. For 
example, we acknowledge that these relationships may be affected by several factors, such as 
investment in plant and machinery that is unrelated to the EU ETS, the closure of some plants 
due to production inefficiencies or poor demand, tax changes, transfer pricing, et cetera. Hence, 
to deal with endogeneity stemming from omitted variable bias we include several control 
variables which are readily available to us, whilst to mitigate concerns related to reverse 
causality, we lag the right-hand side variables. 
 
Empirical results 
We estimate variants of regression Eq. (3) to test the first three hypotheses, namely H1, H2 and 
H3. Table 3 presents the results when excess emissions measured in percentage terms (EEP) is 
used as the dependent variable, whereas Table 4 presents similar regression models using the 
z-score standardized excess emissions in euro terms (zEEE).16   
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 around here] 
Specifically, the first three hypotheses posit that publicly-listed firms (H1), state-owned firms 
(H2) and firms headquartered in common law legal systems (H3) are less environmentally 
proactive on average than their peers. In this respect and following the specification of 
regression Eq. (3), we would expect 𝛾1 > 0, 𝛾2 > 0 and 𝛾3 > 0, respectively. Based on the 
collective evidence reported in columns [1] to [4] of Tables 3 and 4, there is strong statistical 
evidence (p-values < 0.05) in support of these hypotheses (with a minor exception for PUBLIC, 
which turns not statistically significant when EEP is used as the dependent variable in Table 
3).  
                                                 
16 The standardized variable, zEEE, is used hereinafter in the regression analysis. 
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Aside from our ex-ante hypotheses, the interaction terms of the main variables 
(PUBLIC, STATE, COMMON) with the proactive dummies (PRO20 and PRO20_IA) from 
estimating Eq. (3) provide some interesting results. As shown in columns [5] and [6] these 
interaction coefficients are negative and, in general, they are at statistically significant levels. 
This evidence suggests that at least within the specifically proactive range, publicly-listed 
firms, state-owned firms and firms that operate in common law legal systems tend to be more 
proactive compared to their peers.17   
Next, to examine H4, we estimate variants of regression Eq. (4) and the results are 
shown in Table 5. The dependent variable is the future growth rate in verified emissions and 
takes the two following cases: (i) in columns [1]-[3] we use 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+2 measured as the 
natural logarithm of the verified emission in year t+2 divided by the verified emission in year 
t+1; and, (ii) in columns [4]-[6] we use 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+3 measured as the natural logarithm of the 
verified emission in year t+3 divided by the verified emission in year t+1. All independent 
variables are measured in year t. The variables related to testing H4, namely PRO20 and 
PRO20_IA, are expected to turn negative, However, in Table 5, we also explicitly show the 
regression coefficients for EEP and zEEE to investigate whether a firm’s excess emissions 
behaviour is informative regarding the future growth rate of verified emissions.18 
[Insert Table 5] 
Two main results emerge from these tables. First, across the different specifications, EEP and 
EEE do not appear to influence the future growth of verified emissions in a statistically 
                                                 
17 Regarding the robustness of the results note that they remain robust when we keep in our analysis the industries 
with less than 1% representations (which we had dropped from the sample as part of the filtering procedure). Also, 
they remain robust when we trim the sample at the values of EEP greater than 500% instead 300%. More 
importantly, they remain robust for different thresholds of proactiveness (i.e., <=-15% or <=-25%) and results are 
available on request from the authors. Also note that the exclusion of industry fixed effects does not alter the 
results. Lastly, they remain robust if we replace the yearly average futures prices with the December’s futures 
(end of year prices).   
18 The correlation between EEP and zEEE is 0.173, hence including both of them in the same specification does 
not create any multicollinearity issues.  
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significant fashion. Hence, neither the economic cost/benefits of polluting above or below a 
firm’s allocation as captured by zEEE, nor the pure excess pollution measure as captured by 
EEP, appear to matter. Second, assessing the results in columns [2] and [5] for PRO20 and 
columns [3] and [6] for PR20_IA, there is statistical evidence supporting a strong negative 
relationship between a firm’s proactive behaviour and future growth in its verified emissions. 
This evidence lends credence to the notion that firms that are characterized as having an 
environmentally proactive behaviour are committed to reducing future GGE. Taken together, 
this evidence lends strong support to H4. 
Finally, to examine H5, we estimate Eq. (5) and the results are shown in Table 6. 
Regarding the dependent variables used, in columns [1]-[3] we present model specifications 
wherein the dependent variable is the one-year-ahead return on equity (ROE), whilst in 
columns [4]-[7] we present model specifications wherein the dependent variable is the one-
year-ahead market return performance (RET). In all model specifications, the variables related 
to testing H5, namely PRO20 and PRO20_IA, are measured in year t. Regarding the control 
variables, we use the return on assets (ROA) in year t when the dependent variable is the one-
year-ahead ROE as per columns [1]-[3], while ROE in year t is used as a control variable when 
the dependent variable is the one-year-ahead RET as per columns [4]-[6]. As an acid test of 
H5, column [7] employs a specification wherein we use the one-year-ahead ROE as a control 
variable; this treatment precludes the possibility that a firm’s proactive behaviour proxy for 
firm performance. The regression models shown in these tables include all variables as per 
Table 2 as additional controls, namely size, operating profitability and cash flow, asset growth, 
capital expenditures, book leverage, R&D expense, industry competition, country GDP growth 
and short-term interest rates.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
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H5 posits that firms adopting an environmentally proactive stance damage their financial 
performance in the short-term. In this respect, Table 6 provides ample empirical evidence to 
support this proposition. Focusing on the main proactive variable, the results in column [2] 
show a strong negative relationship between PRO20 and one-year-ahead ROE (p-values <0 
.01), whilst the results in column [5] also show a strong negative relationship between PRO20 
and one-year-ahead RET (p-values < 0.01). This latter negative relationship persists even, as in 
column [7], we use the one-year-ahead ROE as a control variable. The use of PRO20_IA as an 
alternative proactive behaviour variable in general19 supports the previous inferences 
suggesting that environmentally proactive firms have lower firm performance.  
  
Discussion and conclusions  
Environmental policy and the associated regulation are often designed with both an expected 
level of compliance and a normative encouragement to further reduce production-related 
pollution. But how do firms respond to such regulation and how does this affect their 
performance? In the Business and Management literature, the environmental behaviour of 
firms is typically measured by KLD ratings, however the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) provides a more natural experiment to observe behaviour. Specifically, firm-level data 
on verified and allocated emissions allowances from the trading scheme captures actual firm 
behaviour rather than imputed behaviour derived from survey measures. 
In the extant literature, proactive firms are generally characterised as providing a 
response to policy which is more positive than mere compliance; for example, cutting 
emissions more than required. We suggest that distance between verified and allocated 
emissions provides a potential measure for the proactivity of firms. In particular, if verified 
emissions are substantially less than those allocated, this could be categorised as an 
                                                 
19 Although in column [6] of Table 6, the coefficient on PRO20_IA, whilst negative, is not significant.  
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environmentally proactive firm. Moreover, given allowances can be bought or sold within the 
EU ETS, an economic version of this measure can be calculated. 
Drawing on literature from the economic, finance, stakeholder and comparative 
capitalism arenas, we posit five hypotheses related to corporate environmental proactivity, 
GGE and firm performance, testing these using a panel approach with data covering the EU 
ETS firms from 2005 to 2016. In sum, we typically find evidence in favour of the hypotheses 
and therefore that: publicly-listed firms (H1), state-owned firms (H2) and firms headquartered 
in common law legal systems (H3) are less environmentally proactive than their peers; 
additionally, firms which have environmentally proactive behaviour are found to reduce future 
GGE by more than other firms (H4) and diminish their future financial performance (H5).   
Reflecting on the effectiveness of EU ETS, and given that whilst environmental 
proactiveness is associated with greater reductions in GGE it is also linked with poorer firm 
performance, our results suggest there is an economic cost to good environmental behaviour. 
In other words, whilst the EU ETS is reducing emissions for participating installations, it is not 
yet adequately compensating proactive firms or penalising those who pollute. Why might this 
be?  
As shown in Figure 2 and discussed earlier, GGE futures prices are relatively volatile, 
moving relatively quickly from around €20 in 2005 to their all-time high in mid-2008, dropping 
quickly below €15 in early 2009, and then plunging even further to lower values as we move 
forward to more recent periods. One might assume that the typical firm would consider the 
overall economic cost/benefit; indeed, this is the premise behind cap-and-trade schemes such 
as the EU ETS. For example, given fluctuating GGE futures prices, the economic cost for a 
firm that overshoots by 5% in 2008 is many times higher compared to the same firm when it 
overshoots by 5% in 2016. In fact, the relatively high emission prices in Phase II would have 
created many incentives for firms to become temporally proactive, restricting their production 
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process and selling their allocated emissions in the open market. On the contrary, the cost of 
buying carbon emissions from the open market in recent years has been relatively low, hence 
the cost of polluting more has also been commensurately low. If such reasoning is correct, then 
firms would have been more proactive in Phase II rather than Phase III. In fact, this is supported 
by the data. To show this Table 7 presents the coefficients from estimating a logit regression 
where the dependent variable is PRO20 in columns [3] and [4]. Moreover, to get a sense of 
what happens in the neighbourhood of PRO20, we also estimate the logit model for PRO15 in 
columns [1]-[2] and PRO25 in columns [5]-[6]; these variables are defined analogously to 
PRO20 but for thresholds of -15 and -25 percent.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Considering the phase dummies estimated in Table 7 for PRO20 shows clearly that phase II is 
more likely to observe firms behaving proactively (in column [4] the odds ratio suggests that 
it’s 71 percent more likely), whereas in phase III, a firm being environmentally proactive 
becomes much less likely (in column [4] the odds ratio suggests that it’s 55 percent less likely). 
Similar results are inferred when considering PRO15 and PRO25. This provides an important 
policy implication as it appears that firms will switch from being proactive when GGE market 
prices are relatively high to becoming non-proactive when prices are relatively low. Such a 
finding correlates with evidence in Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015) who show there is a large and 
statistically significant carbon premium in stock returns at the beginning of Phase II.  
 To return to the earlier question, the EU ETS is not yet adequately compensating 
proactive firms or penalising polluters because GGE market prices have often been too low, 
particularly during Phase III. This provides further evidence that policymakers need to be 
mindful of any large oversupply of allowances and suggests that the twin policies of ‘back-
loading’ in phase III (i.e., the postponement of allowance auctions) and the market stability 
reserve (i.e., a permanent operational function to oversee the supply and demand of emissions) 
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due to start in January 2019 are necessary to ensure the EU ETS encourages corporate 
environmental proactivity and therefore the reduction of GGE. The work in this study indicates 
the market stability reserve should be operated to ensure GGE market prices are at a high 
enough level to significantly increase the compensation for proactive firms and in doing so will 
increase the number of such firms.  
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  European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)  
Related Variables 
AE = Allocated emissions in metric tonnes CO2 equivalent (aggregated across all firm 
installations). 
VE = Verified emissions measured in metric tonnes CO2 equivalent (aggregated across all 
firm installations). 
EE = The per-firm excess emissions calculated as: VE - AE. 
EEP = The per-firm excess emissions in percentage terms, calculated as:  
(VE – AE) / AE. 
EEE = An economic measure of excess emissions in Euro term, calculated as: 
EE * f, whereby f represents the relevant futures price for CO2 EU allowances. 
zEEE  Α z-score standardized version of EEE. 
Phase I  Phase I of the EU ETS and, accordingly, it takes the value 1 for years from 2005 to 
2007, and 0 otherwise. 
Phase II  Phase II of the EU ETS and, accordingly, it takes the value 1 for years from 2008 to 
2012, and 0 otherwise. 
Phase III  Phase III of the EU ETS and, accordingly, in our sample it takes the value 1 for years 
from 2013 to 2016, and 0 otherwise. 
   
  Main Variables Used in Hypotheses Testing  
PUBLIC  = A dummy variable indicating publicly-listed firms and, accordingly, it takes the 
value 1 for a publicly-listed firm, and 0 otherwise. 
STATE  = A dummy variable indicating stated-owned firms and, accordingly, it takes the value 
1 when the government has a stake of 5 percent or more, and 0 otherwise. 
COMMON  = A dummy variable indicating that a firm operates in a common law legal system and, 
accordingly, it takes the value 1 when the firm’s headquarters are in a common law 
legal system, and 0 otherwise. 
PRO20 = A dummy variable to capture the environmentally proactive firms, which takes the 
value 1 for firm-year observations whereby EEP ≤ -20 percent, and 0 otherwise. 
PRO20_IA = A year-industry adjusted dummy variable to capture the environmentally proactive 
firms, which takes the value 1 for firm-year observations whereby the per year and 
per-industry adjusted EEP ≤ -20 percent, and 0 otherwise. 
   
  Other Variables 
EU28  = Takes the value 1 for firms headquartered with the EU-28 zone, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTALATIONS = The number of GGE emitting installations. 
RET = Annual cumulative market returns computed from monthly compounded returns 
during the fiscal year. 
ROE = The ratio of income before interests and taxes to book value of equity. 
ROA = The ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets. 
CASH FLOW = Operating income before depreciation divided by beginning of the year net assets. 
ASSET GROWTH = The difference between year t and t-1 in total assets divided by beginning of the year 
total assets. 
CAPEX = Capital expenditures divided by beginning of the year total assets. 
LEV = The ratio of total loans to book value of equity. 
R&D = The ratio of research and development expenses to total assets (missing values of 
research and development expenses are replaced with zero). 
HERFINDAHL = The sum for each year of the squared ratio of segment sales at the 4-digit SIC code 
level to firm sales divided by the squared sum for each year of the ratio of segment 
sales at the 4-digit SIC code level to firm sales. 
GDP GROWTH = The country growth in GDP between years t and t-1. 




Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for firm emissions and related variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
       
AE 8,942  2,339,412   7,890,990   70,153   336,205   1,400,000  
VE 8,942  2,427,191   8,702,215   54,829   307,740   1,400,000  
EE 8,942  87,779   2,225,890  -100,000  -9,804   13,151  
EEP 8,942 -0.020 0.496 -0.266 -0.091 0.110 
EEE 8,942  994,319   33,827,256  -1,442,667  -114,477   121,940  
PRO20 8,942 0.335 0.472 0 0 1 
PRO20_IA 8,942 0.209 0.407 0 0 0 
INSTALLATIONS 8,942 9.707 23.613 1 3 8 
PUBLIC 8,942 0.306 0.461 0 0 1 
STATE 8,942 0.057 0.233 0 0 0 
COMMON 8,942 0.145 0.352 0 0 0 
EU28 8,942 0.892 0.311 1 1 1 
Phase I 8,942 0.261 0.439 0 0 1 
Phase II 8,942 0.443 0.497 0 0 1 
Phase III 8,942 0.296 0.457 0 0 1 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics for firm emissions and related variables. The sample covers the 






Table 2: Summary statistics for firm performance and related variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
       
ROE (t+1) 1605 0.206 0.206 0.083 0.177 0.302 
RET (t+1) 1150 0.034 0.375 -0.182 0.027 0.234 
ROA 1605 0.061 0.181 0.005 0.033 0.066 
SIZE 1605 9.054 1.906 7.840 9.004 10.341 
EARN 1605 0.294 0.880 0.083 0.148 0.228 
CASH FLOW 1605 0.533 1.353 0.165 0.298 0.462 
ASSET GROWTH 1605 0.505 3.100 -0.040 0.028 0.111 
CAPEX 1605 0.094 0.231 0.032 0.052 0.080 
LEV 1605 0.960 0.833 0.461 0.742 1.222 
R&D 1605 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.009 
HERFINDAHL 1605 0.133 0.272 0.000 0.003 0.087 
GDP GROWTH 1605 0.012 0.027 0.002 0.016 0.030 
RATE 1605 0.021 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.039 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics for firm financial performance and related variables. The sample 






Table 3: Firm-level ownership structure, legal system and excess emissions measured in 
percentage terms 
 
 Excess emissions measured in percentage terms (EEP) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
PUBLIC 0.017 
(1.47) 






















PRO20     -0.560*** 
(-60.63) 
 
PRO20 x PUBLIC     0.111*** 
(7.01) 
 
PRO20 x STATE     -0.195*** 
(-5.52) 
 
PRO20 x COMMON     -0.018 
(-0.91) 
 
PRO20_IA      -0.659*** 
(-59.44) 
PRO20_IA x PUBLIC      0.0888*** 
(4.75) 
PRO20_IA x STATE      -0.107*** 
(-2.86) 
PRO20_IA x COMMON      -0.004 
(-0.17) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Phase II & III dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj R-sq 0.195 0.197 0.196 0.198 0.440 0.463 
Obs. 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 
 
Notes. This table reports the regression results of Eq. (3) for testing H1, H2 and H3 using data covering the years 
2005-2016. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the excess emissions measured in percentage terms 
(EEP). Regression models are estimated with control variables (EU28, INSTALLATIONS) and fixed effects (Phase 
II & III dummies, industry dummies). Regression coefficients’ t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated 
using robust standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and clustered across firms and 
years. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 






Table 4: Firm-level ownership structure, legal system and excess emissions measured in 
euro terms 
 
 Excess emissions measured in euro terms (zEEE) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
PUBLIC 0.080*** 
(4.07) 






















PRO20     -0.106*** 
(-12.14) 
 
PRO20 x PUBLIC     -0.362*** 
(-6.69) 
 
PRO20 x STATE     -0.280*** 
(3.02) 
 
PRO20 x COMMON     -0.068* 
(-1.63) 
 
PRO20_IA      -0.100*** 
(-11.27) 
PRO20_IA x PUBLIC      -0.025 
(-0.84) 
PRO20_IA x STATE      -0.355*** 
(-4.46) 
PRO20_IA x COMMON      -0.071** 
(-1.97) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PHASE II & III dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj R-sq 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.065 0.043 
Obs. 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 
 
Notes. This table reports the regression results of Eq. (3) for testing H1, H2 and H3 using data covering the years 
2005-2016. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the z-score standardized excess emissions measured in 
euro terms (zEEE). Regression models are estimated with control variables (EU28, INSTALLATIONS) and fixed 
effects (Phase II & III dummies, industry dummies). Regression coefficients’ t-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are estimated using robust standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and clustered across 
firms and years. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% 







Table 5: Environmentally proactive behaviour and future growth in verified emissions  
 
 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+2 𝐺𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+1:𝑡+3 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
PRO20  -0.027** 
(-2.23) 
  -0.048*** 
(-2.55) 
 
PRO20_IA   -0.036** 
(-1.98) 


























Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PHASE II & III dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj R-sq 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.043 0.044 0.045 
Obs. 7,192 7,192 7,192 6,354 6,354 6,354 
 
Notes. This table reports the regression results of Eq. (4) for testing H4 using data covering the years 2005-2016. 
The dependent variable is the future growth rate in verified emissions; particularly, in columns [1]-[3] it is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the verified emission in year t+2 divided by the verified emission in year 
t+1, whilst in columns [4]-[6] it is measured as the natural logarithm of the verified emission in year t+3 divided 
by the verified emission in year t+1. EEP is excess emissions measured in percentage terms and zEEE is the z-
score standardized version of EEE that measures excess emissions in Euro terms. Regression models are estimated 
with control variables (PUBLIC, STATE, COMMON, EU28, INSTALLATIONS) and fixed effects (Phase II & III 
dummies, industry dummies). Regression coefficients’ t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated using 
robust standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and clustered across firms and years. 
All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 






Table 6: Environmentally proactive behaviour and future financial performance  
 
 ROE ROE ROE RET RET RET RET 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
PRO20  -0.036*** 
(-3.18) 




PRO20_IA   -0.044*** 
(-2.93) 





































    







ROE (t + 1)       0.529*** 
(6.33) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PHASE II & III dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj R-sq 0.635 0.635 0.635 0.037 0.045 0.037 0.092 
Obs. 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 
 
Notes. This table reports the regression results of Eq. (5) for testing H5 using data covering the years 2005-2016. 
The dependent variable is a firm’s future one-year-ahead financial performance, particularly, in columns [1]-[3] 
it is measured as return on equity (ROE) in year t+1, whilst in columns [4]-[7] it is measured as the annual 
cumulative market return (RET) in year t+1. EEP is excess emissions measured in percentage terms, zEEE is the 
z-score standardized version of EEE that measures excess emissions in Euro terms and ROA is returns on assets. 
Regression models are estimated with control variables (SIZE, EARN, CASH FLOW, ASSET GROWTH, CAPEX, 
LEV, R&D, HERFINDAHL, GDP GROWTH, RATE) and fixed effects (Phase II & III dummies, industry 
dummies). Regression coefficients’ t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and clustered across firms and years. All variable definitions 




Table 7: EU ETS phase II & III and environmentally proactive behaviour 
 
 PRO15 PRO20 PRO25 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
























Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
QICu 11,220.64 11,186.12 10,702.42 10,660.54 9,896.19 9,822.18 
Obs. 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 8,942 
 
Notes. This table reports logistic regression results using data covering the years 2005-2016 for testing a firm’s 
environmentally proactive behaviour across the EU ETS phases. The dependent variable is a firm’s 
environmentally proactive behaviour, particularly, in columns [1]-[2] it is measured with a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when EEP≤-15 percent and 0 otherwise (PRO15), in columns [3]-[4] it is measured with a dummy that 
takes the value 1 when EEP≤-20 percent and 0 otherwise (PRO20) and in columns [5]-[6] it is measured with a 
dummy that takes the value 1 when EEP≤-25 percent and 0 otherwise (PRO25). Regression models in columns 
[1], [3] and [5] do not include any control variables, whereas those in columns [2], [4] and [6] include control 
variables (i.e., PUBLIC, STATE, COMMON, EU28, INSTALLATIONS). All models include fixed effects (Phase 
II & III dummies, industry dummies). Regression coefficients’ z-statistics (reported in parentheses) are estimated 
using robust standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and clustered across firms. All variable definitions are 
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